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Modern Statutes, Loose Canons, and
the Limits of Practical Reason: A
Response to Farber and Ross
Edward L. Rubin*
Daniel Farber' and Stephen Ross,2 in separate contributions to this
Symposium, raise the most crucial question in modern statutory inter-
pretation, a question that exposes the profound triviality of the canons
of statutory construction that Karl Llewellyn so effectively attacked.3
Ross points out that the legislature can control, or at least attempt to
control, the judicial use of the canons by the way it drafts the statute
and by effective use of supplementary materials such as mark-ups, com-
mittee reports, and floor debates.4 Farber, in his critique of formalism,
demonstrates that formalist interpretation is an impediment to effec-
tive statutory drafting.5 Inherent in both propositions is an emphasis on
the process of statutory construction. This leads to the basic insight
that a statute is not a received text, like the Bible or a Shakespearean
play. It is a directive issued by the legislature. Statutes are the instru-
mentalities by which our primary policymaking institutions carry out
their mission. They determine how our society is organized and, to a
disturbingly large extent, whether it prospers or declines.
Courts are not the audience for a statute, cheering at its triumphs
and groaning over its vicissitudes. They are not the statute's critics,
weighing its aesthetic qualities and guiding us through its profundities
of meaning. Rather, they are mechanisms for implementing statutes,
and thus active participants in our modern scheme of statutory govern-
ance. The crucial question in statutory interpretation is how courts
should fulfill this role, a question that can be answered only by a com-
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of California Berkeley, School of Law.
J.D., Yale University, 1979.
1. Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the
Rule of Law, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 533 (1992).
2. Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its
Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 561 (1992).
3. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Ca-
nons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev 395 (1950).
4. Ross, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at part V (cited in note 2).
5. Farber, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at part III.B. (cited in note 1).
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prehensive theory of policymaking and implementation in the modern
administrative state.
Canons of statutory construction are premised on a mistaken no-
tion of the judiciary's role. They presume that the courts are observers
rather than participants, and that a statute is primarily a linguistic arti-
fact, rather than a mechanism for allocating resources and deploying
force. These misimpressions, serious even when the canons were first
formulated, become fatal in the modern administrative state. As the in-
strumental, regulatory aspect of a statute becomes more pronounced,
the decontextualized, linguistic approach that characterizes the canons
becomes increasingly irrelevant.
A. The Character of Modern Statutes
The legislature is our dominant policymaking body, but it does not
implement the policies it formulates; that task belongs to the executive
and the judiciary. While we usually conceptualize this as the separation
of powers doctrine, it is, in fact, a specialization of functions that the
sheer size of modern government demands. As a result of this speciali-
zation, statutes are essentially the legislature's instructions to imple-
mentation mechanisms. They tell these mechanisms-courts and
administrative agencies, for the most part-how to allocate resources,
deploy state power, issue information, and organize their internal oper-
ations. For example, at the most basic level, a statute forbidding mur-
der tells the police to arrest anyone suspected of the defined activity
and instructs the courts to convict anyone proved to have committed it.
A statute requiring banks to make funds deposited by customers in
their checking accounts available to those customers within a given pe-
riod of time tells bank regulators to impose sanctions on any bank that
fails to observe the time limits.
This view of legislation was originally articulated by the legal posi-
tivists, most particularly Hans Kelsen. Kelsen argued that statutes are
instructions to other governmental units, consisting entirely of rules for
imposing sanctions rather than rules for proper conduct by the general
citizenry.' On this point, he has been properly and persuasively at-
tacked.7 The value of Kelsen's approach, however, is obscured because
he focused almost entirely on statutes that are enforced by the judici-
ary. In this traditional, nonadministrative context, Kelsen's approach is
6. See Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 58-64 (Harvard, 1945). For a precur-
sor, see Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General 140-44 (Athlone, H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970); for an
elaboration, see Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of
Legal System 70-112 (Clarendon, 2d ed. 1980).
7. See, e.g. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 35-41 (Oxford, 1961); Raz, The Concept of a
Legal System at 85-91, 111-20 (cited in note 6).
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at its weakest and is, in some sense, irrelevant. Nothing particular fol-
lows from treating a statute forbidding murder as an instruction to
courts, rather than a rule of conduct for citizens, except a justification
for other parts of Kelsen's theory.
The real significance of Kelsen's approach becomes apparent in a
context that neither Kelsen nor most other jurisprudential writers have
considered-the administrative state, that is, the world we actually in-
habit. In this context, the directive theory of legislation offers impor-
tant conceptual returns because many modern statutes consist
exclusively of instructions to an administrative agency; they articulate
no rules for private persons at all. Consider, for example, the Expedited
Funds Availability Act of 1987,8 which was designed to eliminate ex-
tended "hold" periods on funds deposited in checking accounts. The
Act establishes an explicit availability schedule and requires banks to
disclose that schedule to customers, but it clearly contemplates that an
administrative agency, the Federal Reserve Board, will promulgate the
implementing regulations. Many of its provisions do not even become
operative until those regulations are promulgated. 9 In effect, the statu-
tory requirements are instructions to the Federal Reserve Board stating
the minimum content of its regulations. This point is emphasized by
the relative size of the two promulgations; the Act's availability and dis-
closure rules are stated in eight admittedly long pages of the U.S. Code,
but the implementing regulations occupy forty-five densely worded
pages in the Code of Federal Regulations. Moreover, the Act contains
additional provisions which are pure administrative instructions. 0 They
state no rule of behavior whatsoever, but simply instruct the Federal
Reserve to consider certain types of regulations or operational
approaches.
Thus, the directive character of legislation can be regarded as a
matter of degree. Some statutes, while admittedly operating as instruc-
tions to implementation mechanisms such as courts, contain explicit
rules that apply to private persons as well. Other statutes, however,
consist largely or exclusively of instructions to a governmental actor. I
previously have referred to this feature of legislation as its degree of
transitivity.11 A transitive statute passes through its implementation
mechanism and speaks directly to private persons; an intransitive stat-
8. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 635 (1987), codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1988).
9. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4002(b)(4), 4003, 4004, 4008 (1988).
10. It states, for example: "In order to improve the check processing system, the [Federal
Reserve] Board shall consider (among other proposals) requiring, by regulation, that. . . (2) the
Federal Reserve banks and depository institutions provide for check truncation." Id. § 4008(b).




ute speaks exclusively to the implementation mechanism and instructs
that mechanism to make the rules. Many statutes contain a mixture of
provisions, which can be ranged on a continuum from the high transi-
tivity of a simple criminal prohibition to the high intransitivity of the
Expedited Funds Availability Act's recommendations to the Federal
Reserve.
By and large, administrative rulemaking is the feature that distin-
guishes intransitive from transitive legislation. An intransitive statute
instructs an agency to make rules rather than stating the applicable
rules itself. Before the rise of the administrative state, when courts were
the primary implementation mechanism, most statutes were highly
transitive because courts did not possess rulemaking power. Meir Dan-
Cohen has shown that even statutes addressed to courts are not fully
transitive since courts have a more sophisticated understanding of rules
than ordinary citizens.'" High levels of intransitivity, however, are char-
acteristic only of a modern state with administrative agencies that ar-
ticulate the bulk of the operative governmental rules.
No theory of statutory interpretation can be coherent unless it rec-
ognizes basic features of our governmental scheme, such as the varying
degrees of transitivity that modern statutes possess. To begin with,
agency rulemaking under an intransitive statute can be regarded as a
basic interpretation of that statute. But this is clearly a very different
type of interpretation than the interpretation undertaken by a court. It
occurs prospectively, rather than in response to a contested case; it gen-
erally'requires independent fact finding by the agency and often envi-
sions significant extension of the statutory requirements based upon the
facts discovered; it allows much greater room for discretion and de-
mands much greater detail. The difference between judicial adjudica-
tion and agency rulemaking is well known, of course; the important
point is that both processes involve interpretation of a statute.
Even if we restrict ourselves to the judicial interpretation of stat-
utes, the relative degrees of transitivity that characterize contemporary
statutes will make an enormous difference. It is one thing for the court
to interpret a statute that states transitive rules, applicable in terms to
private persons. It is quite another thing for the court to interpret a
statute that instructs an administrative agency to formulate the appli-
cable rules. Two differences are particularly notable. First, the type of
language that is appropriate for imposing obligations on private persons
12. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules; On Acoustic Separation in Crimi-
nal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984). The judge may understand a certain categorically stated rule
as representing a complex doctrine of exceptions and qualifications, while the public perceives
nothing but a blanket prohibition.
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is quite distinct from the language appropriate for issuing instructions
to a government agency. Second, the role of the court is different; in
one case, it is the primary implementation mechanism, responsible for
imposing the statutory obligations on private persons; in the other case,
the court is evaluating the implementation strategy of a separate gov-
ernmental unit and deciding whether that unit has exceeded the
bounds of its instructions.
Perhaps someone could articulate an overarching theory of statu-
tory interpretation that would apply to every type of statute, but such a
grand generalization must be grounded on a thorough understanding of
the various categories that it is designed to unify. To venture forth into
the realm of general theory while oblivious to the differences that exist
within the subject matter is a losing strategy. It is a method worthy of
the ancient Greek physicists who concluded that all physical materials
could be categorized as air, water, earth and fire, without any under-
standing of the differences between elementary particles and atoms, ele-
ments and compounds, or metals and nonmetals.
B. The Problem of Loose Canons
The fact that modern statutes are instructions to implementation
mechanisms which operate within a larger scheme of governance indi-
cates why the standard canons of statutory construction are generally
useless and occasionally harmful. The canons are decontextualized; they
are general statements about the interpretation of statutory language
with no consideration of the different types of statutes or the different
roles that courts play in relation to these statutes. They are loose ca-
nons, showing up at unpredictable times and rolling about in unpredict-
able directions. Worse than their unpredictability is their oppressive
noise and the ever-present danger of explosion. They distract judges
from the real task at hand-the determination of the statute's role, and
their own role, in the complicated task of modern governance.
A statute's structural features, such as its degree of transitivity,
will control the applicability of many standard canons of interpretation.
One of the most familiar canons is ejusdem generis: "where general
words follow an enumeration they are to be held as applying only to
persons and things of the same general kind or class specifically men-
tioned. '13 Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, in their contribution to
this Symposium," give the example of the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), which forbids unions to "fine, sus-
13. Llewellyn, 3 Vand. L. Rev. at 405 (cited in note 3).
14. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and
Judicial Preferences, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 647 (1992).
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pend, expel, or otherwise discipline" members for exercising certain
labor-related rights.15 In Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers,"8 the issue
was whether the union, by discriminating against the plaintiff in mak-
ing job referrals through its hiring hall, was engaged in discipline for-
bidden by the Act. Applying the rule of ejusdem generis,7 the Supreme
Court held that "discipline" referred to sanctions authorized by the
union, not "personal vendettas" by union officials.' 8 Justice Stevens dis-
sented from this holding, relying on the usage of the term "discipline"
in prior Supreme Court cases.' 9 This, of course, is another canon of
statutory construction; as might be expected, it often leads in an oppo-
site direction from ejusdem generis.
Both canons of statutory construction that the Justices invoked in
Breininger are loose canons. They are incoherent without an under-
standing of the statute's position in our administrative structure. The
initial questions to ask are what implementation mechanism is the leg-
islature addressing and in what terms is that mechanism being ad-
dressed. These issues do not turn on legislative intent or any
metaphysical assumptions about the thought processes of a collective
body. They are determined by the structural features of the statute
itself.
The LMRDA is addressed to both the courts and an administrative
agency. Although the National Labor Relations Board has exclusive ju-
risdiction over certain labor issues, complainants may bring suits under
the LMRDA directly in federal court. As a statute addressed to courts,
the LMRDA is transitive; it states rules that are meant to be under-
stood and applied by private persons. The LMRDA also is addressed to
the Board, of course, but since the Board is notorious for relying on
adjudication, not rulemaking-a fact well known to Congress when the
Act was passed 2 0 -this does not alter its transitive character.
For a transitive statute, ejusdem generis is a sensible rule. Private
parties need to know what conduct the statute proscribes, and a phrase
forbidding unions to "otherwise discipline" a member is incomprehensi-
bly vague unless it takes its meaning from a preceding list. The dis-
sent's canon is much less preferable because judicial constructions of
15. 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1988); see also id. at § 411(a)(5).
16. 493 U.S. 67 (1989).
17. Id. at 92 (citing C. Dallas Sands, 2A Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.17 (Calla-
ghan, 4th ed. 1984)).
18. Id. at 94.
19. Id. at 96-98 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part).
20. See, for example, Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law 215-18 (Little, Brown, 3d ed.
1991); Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, 79 Yale L.J. 571 (1970); Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Ad-
ministrative Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 393, 430-33 (1981).
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the same term in widely different contexts are not particularly accessi-
ble to private parties who will tend to look to the statute for guidance.
If the same words were part of an intransitive statute-if they were
instructing an administrative agency to promulgate a regulation-the
mode of interpretation would be quite different. The concern with pre-
dictability would greatly diminish because the statutory language would
not affect private parties until the agency had adopted the intervening
regulation. Instructions to make rules can be stated much more loosely;
more important, they can include an example that is intended to clarify
the sort of rules that the agency is instructed to adopt without necessa-
rily setting limits on the scope of those rules as they operate over
time.2 ' In other words, the legislation might tell the agency to make
rules forbidding retaliatory discipline, mentioning fines as a dramatic
example, without implying that the agency could reach only analogous
behavior.
One could go through much of Llewellyn's battery of canons and
illustrate how their relevance depends upon structural features of a
statute such as transitivity. For example, it is much more important to
give words their ordinary meaning in a transitive statute;2 2 intransitive
statutes can rely heavily on technical usages, particularly when the leg-
islators know that such usages are familiar to the rulemaker. Similarly,
the rule against implying unstated exceptions makes sense only for a
transitive statute;23 the power to make exceptions is an inherent feature
of rulemaking, and a court should not construe a statute to deny a
rulemaker that power unless the statute states an explicit prohibition .2
The plain meaning canon recently proposed by Frederick Schauer2 5
is no better than the ones Llewellyn criticized. According to Schauer,
plain meaning is the medium that enables him to "converse with an
English speaker with whom I have nothing in common but our shared
language."2 6 While that is an empirically false assumption about the re-
lationship of an American legislature and its citizens (it may be true for
an American legislature and an English-speaking citizen of Pakistan) it
21. See Rubin, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 418-23 (cited in note 11).
22. Llewellyn, 3 Vand. L. Rev. at 404 (cited in note 3).
23. Id.
24. See Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and
the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process, 1984 Duke L.J. 163. This is
not meant to suggest that exceptions are always beneficial; in his study, Schuck points out their
disadvantages as well as their advantages. The point is that exceptions, discretionary and "unruly"
though they may be, are a basic administrative tool, one that any theory of statutory interpreta-
tion in a modern state should take into account.
25. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain
Meaning, 1990 S. Ct. Rev. 231.
26. Id. at 250.
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is conceivably a useful device for construing transitive legislation.
With respect t6 intransitive legislation, however, it is not only empiri-
cally false, but genuinely disruptive of our governmental system. Far
from being in the position of two people who share nothing but lan-
guage, a legislature and the administrative agencies within the same ju-
risdiction are linked by an incredibly dense network of relationships
and shared activities. A much better analogy than two English-speaking
strangers would be two members of a single family. The legislature and
the agencies spend their entire lives supporting, attacking, cajoling,
commanding, resisting, annoying, deceiving, upsetting, consoling, pro-
tecting, correcting, and wounding each other. Like family members,
they develop a shared and specialized set of linguistic understandings
based on this continuous, intense relationship. To restrict them to the
discourse of strangers would distort and constrain modern governmen-
tal processes.1s
Llewellyn correctly stated that canons of statutory construction fail
as decision rules because of their contradictory and indeterminate na-
ture. He was partially correct to ascribe reliance on the canons to the
need for post hoc rationalization and the desire to substitute recipes for
judgment. But he overlooked the principal reason why the canons are
indeterminate. Whatever the moral and intellectual failings of modern
judges, the basic reason why the canons do not work is that they are
stated in general terms and, thereby, ignore crucial differences in struc-
ture that characterize modern legislation. These differences always have
been present but have become more pronounced in the modern admin-
istrative state. Statutes now speak to different kinds of government ac-
tors in a variety of different voices. They are instruments of governance,
27. Even so, it presents some serious problems. As Geoffrey P. Miller has suggested, the
traditional canons of statutory interpretation can be related to the pragmatic analysis of ordinary
conversation developed by Paul Grice. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of
Interpretation, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1179, 1194. The canon that words are to be construed according
to their ordinary meaning, for example, corresponds to Grice's observation that speech acts gener-
ally are construed to avoid ambiguity and obscurity. H. P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words
(Harvard, 1989). Thus, even the canons, disconnected though they are from the realities of govern-
mental structure, rest upon a context of shared cultural meanings. Schauer apparently is prepared
to dispense with those and rely upon the language itself. He bases this on the institutional features
of the judiciary, particularly their lack of expertise and lack of interest about the content of the
statutory cases they decide. While this may be an excessively jaundiced view of judges, it is cer-
tainly limited to judges, and inapplicable to other types of government decisionmakers.
28. Of course, Schauer is writing only about judicial interpretation, not interpretation of a
statute by an administrative agency. He does not distinguish, however, between judicial interpreta-
tion of transitive and intransitive statutes. Thus, his plain meaning rule would authorize judges to
overrule agency interpretation because they have perceived the "plain meaning" of a statute that
was addressed to, and interpreted by, an administrative agency. By authorizing a court to revise
agency interpretation, Schauer's plain meaning rule is in fact a rule for agency interpretation of
the statute.
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not linguistic puzzles, and no coherent approach to their interpretation
is possible until we understand their role, and the role of their inter-
preters, in our contemporary governmental system.
C. Farber, Ross, and The Limits of Practical Reason
Both Ross and Farber explore promising avenues for developing a
more realistic approach to the interpretation of modern statutes. Both
oppose judicial reliance on canons of statutory construction. Ross views
the canons as a sub rosa device for political opposition to the legisla-
ture, while Farber characterizes them as an emanation of the formalist
illusion that a set of coordinated rules can yield definitive and desirable
judicial outcomes. In place of the canons, Ross recommends that legis-
latures communicate with the judiciary by producing more precise sup-
plementary materials. He recognizes that no language can be
completely canon-proof, but he suggests that published mark-ups,
signed committee reports, and attributed floor statements would serve
as ramparts against the canons' more antagonistic assaults on legislative
intent.2 ' Farber recommends that judges rely on practical reason, an
overall "situation sense" that cannot be reduced to formulae or max-
ims.30 He suggests that the legislature could communicate more effec-
tively with judges who adopt that approach than with judges who
declare their fealty to the canons. 1
These insights are important, but both writers are limited by their
lack of a conceptual framework for the modern governmental system.
The devices Ross proposes for legislative communication with the judi-
ciary are, by his own account, somewhat marginal to the legislative pro-
cess. Yet that entire process is, in fact, a mode of communication with
the judiciary and other implementation mechanisms. The qualitative
distinction between statutory language and legislative history is an at-
tribute of transitive legislation, that is, legislation drafted in a manner
that allows for judicial enforcement. With intransitive legislation, legis-
lation that instructs an agency to issue regulations, the distinction be-
gins to disappear. The legislature can include declarations of intent,
examples, explanations, and supplementary information in the statute
itself. This might facilitate the agency's interpretation of the statute in
its rules, and would certainly provide better information to the public,
and better guidance for courts that review challenges to the rules'
validity.
More significantly, the basic architecture of the statute itself can be
29. Ross, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at part V (cited in note 2).
30. Farber, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at part IV (cited in note 1).
31. Id. at part III.B.
1992]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
regarded as a mode of communication, that is, a directive issued to the
courts or agencies that enforce the legislation. This suggests that legis-
latures should become conscious of their choices and strive to develop a
new methodology or vocabulary to effectuate those choices. The choice
of implementation mechanism, the level of transitivity, the amount of
detail, the use of examples, the instructions about enforcement strategy
and compliance levels, and ultimately, the type of oversight that the
legislature exercises are not simply supplementary features of the stat-
ute-they are the statute itself, particularly when the implementation
mechanism is a modern administrative agency.
Farber urges judges to develop a situation sense, an expert's ability
to grasp a complex set of relationships in their totality. But we need a
comprehensive theory of that situation, a theory of modern governance
that can be communicated to these judges. Once again, the goal is to
enable a decisionmaker-here a judge-to become conscious of the
choices being made and to develop a methodology to effectuate those
choices. When interpreting statutes, judges should distinguish statutes
enforced primarily by the judiciary from those enforced by an adminis-
trative agency and reviewed by the judiciary. In the latter case, more-
over, they should be conscious of the various design features, like the
statute's transitivity, that are characteristic of administratively en-
forced legislation. But Farber's article raises a philosophic issue that
seems to oppose the effort to develop such a theory. Farber not only
attacks formalism, with its enthusiasm for decision rules that are
claimed to yield unambiguous results, but also foundationalism, and
perhaps any general theory of the state.3 2 In his view, analogical think-
ing, derived from previous experience, is a more reliable source of ex-
pertise than systematic theory. The implication of this view is that we
should abandon the quest for a theory of the modern state and focus on
methods by which decisionmakers can develop situational thinking.
Farber is almost certainly correct in looking to practical reason as a
model of judicial thought processes. The point is a general one, but it is
particularly applicable to American judges, who receive no special train-
ing for their role and have no comprehensive legal code upon which to
rely. But as Farber acknowledges, focusing on practical reason may be
"inconsistent with the academic mission .''3 His response is that this
criticism applies only to "practical reason's critique of foundationalism
as a preferred form of legal scholarship. '3 4 He continues: "Significant
(or not) as this dispute may be, the subject at hand is how judges
32. Id. at part II.
33. Id. at part II.A.
34. Id.
588 [Vol. 45:579
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should apply statutes, rather than how professors should write
articles.
35
The difficulty is not so easily dismissed, however, because Farber is
a professor writing an article. His apparent purpose is to engage in a
normative debate about the rules that judges should employ when they
construe statutes. Farber argues against formalism and against the ca-
nons because they are unreliable guides to statutory interpretation; con-
sequently, he must think that his own approach represents an
improvement. This raises the question whether opposing foundational-
ism or noting the pragmatic tendencies of judges is an effective way for
an academic to improve the decisionmaking process. Certainly, this po-
sition represents a start in a particular direction, but it seems insuffi-
cient, by itself, to fulfill the purpose of normative scholarship.
Farber's basic point is that judges should develop a sense of the
situation; for him that constitutes the core of a practical reasoning ap-
proach to statutory construction. But a situation is not an object to be
grasped, like a brass ring. It is the individual's relation to a social and
professional context. To be guided by one's situation cannot mean only
that one is immersed in that context, for everyone is so immersed. If
that is all that one intended, then advising judges to be guided by their
situation would be like advising them to breathe, or to think in their
native language. Rather, the recommendation that judges should be
guided by their situation must mean that they should become aware of
their situation and should identify the salient features of their task.
The scholar's role in normative writing is to aid the deci-
sionmaker's self-awareness, to enable that decisionmaker to grasp the
salient features of the situation and respond to them in appropriate
ways. This generally requires a theory. By means of a theory, the
scholar can provide a cognizable conceptual shape to the deci-
sionmaker's situation. A theory enables the decisionmaker to stand
away from her situation-not to free herself from it, which is undesir-
able, and probably meaningless, but to regard it from a conceptual dis-
tance that fosters self-awareness and control. Such a theory is certainly
not foundationalism; it does not constitute an effort to construct one's
entire world from a few basic principles. It recognizes the situated na-
ture of the individual and develops a comprehensive framework that
will speak to people within the context they inhabit.
For example, the relative transitivity of legislation is a basic aspect
of the judge's situation when she is construing modern legislation. Yet
judges are generally unaware of this feature, although they may indeed




of administrative legislation can illuminate features such as transitivity,
enabling judges to recognize them and understand their implications in
a more consistent, reliable way. It also enables judges to control their
own reactions to this feature and decide the case according to con-
sciously adopted normative positions.
The canons of statutory construction, which Farber properly con-
demns, illustrate the pitfalls of rules without theory, rather than of
rules per se. They obscure real distinctions, focus attention on subsidi-
ary issues and conceal or displace normative choices. Several of the con-
tributors to this Symposium note this phenomenon. Eskridge and
Frickey observe that the Supreme Court has developed a set of substan-
tive canons of construction that it regularly invokes, rather than declar-
ing an offending statute unconstitutional." While they are generally
sympathetic to this approach, they note that it tends to conceal the
judge's normative choices from public scrutiny. Macey and Miller, in
their contribution, view the canons as providing judges with a means of
avoiding substantive judgments.3 7 They view the canons as content-
neutral, rather than content-obscuring, and point out that content-neu-
tral judgments of this sort preclude social debate about the normative
basis of social policy. Social theory, when properly developed, provides
a conceptual tool for isolating, clarifying, and delineating normative
debate.3 8
A theory of the modern administrative state should not be re-
garded as an all or nothing phenomenon. Rather, it is a developing
awareness of the central and unique features of our current governmen-
tal scheme. As a more general, epistemological point, practical reason is
certainly correct; all our thought processes, including our general theo-
ries, are products of our social context. This may deny us access to
transcendental truth, but it promises the possibility of incremental the-
ory. The theorist need not begin from first principles or the nullity of
Cartesian doubt, but can build a conceptual structure through a cri-
tique and reinterpretation of existing understandings.
The opposite of theory is not practical reason but "mechanical ju-
risprudence," cookbook rules and loose canons of statutory construc-
tion. Practical reason, apart from its role as a description of judicial
behavior, serves as a useful caution in the development of theory, a
warning against flights of fancy in the name of knowledge, like Greek
36. William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear State-
ment Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992).
37. Macey and Miller, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at part III (cited in note 14).
38. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L.
Rev. 407 (1989) (recommending a series of substantive canons based on constitutional and institu-
tional concerns, in place of the preexisting linguistic canons).
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physics. Ultimately, however, statutory interpretation requires a con-
ceptual framework that identifies the basic governmental scheme in
which the statute exists. This has always been the case, but it is espe-
cially true now, when the entire structure of our government has
changed, and we must cope with a world that has become unfamiliar to
us. Thus, Farber's practical reason is a correct point as a matter of gen-
eral epistemology, and a useful caution at the level of political theory,
but it is not enough, as an independent conceptual framework. To avoid
being confused by the noise of loose canons, if not wounded by their
unpredictable and undirected firings, we need a political theory of the
modern state.

